Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) rely on in-network aggregation for efficiency, that is, readings from sensor nodes are aggregated at intermediate nodes to reduce the communication cost. However, the previous optimally secure in-network aggregation protocols against multiple corrupted nodes require two round-trip communications between each node and the base station, including the result-checking phase whose congestion is O(log n) where n is the total number of sensor nodes. In this paper * * , we propose an efficient and optimally secure sensor network aggregation protocol against multiple corrupted nodes by a random-walk adversary. Our protocol achieves one round-trip communication to satisfy optimal security without the result-checking phase, by conducting aggregation along with the verification, based on the idea of TESLA technique. Furthermore, we show that the congestion complexity, communication complexity and computational cost in our protocol are constant, i.e., O(1).
Introduction

Background
In many wireless sensor network applications, the data collection sink (base station) needs to find the aggregate statistics of the network. Readings from sensor nodes are aggregated at intermediate nodes to reduce the communication cost. For instance, one aggregation example of sensed temperature data is depicted in Fig. 1 . This process is called innetwork aggregation [2] - [7] , [19] - [21] . Since aggregation reduces the amount of data to be transmitted through the network, it consequently decreases bandwidth consumption and energy depletion.
Security is a critical requirement in data aggregation, since sensor nodes are typically deployed in unsecured locations and are not equipped with tamper-resistant hardware. An adversary is able to replay, modify, delay, drop, and deliver protocol messages out of order as well as inject own messages. However, most aggregation protocols assume that all intermediate nodes are trusted [4] - [15] , [17] - [20] , [22] - [24] except [2] , [3] , [16] , [21] . A corrupted node can easily modify its own sensor reading. It is difficult to detect such a dishonest act in data aggregation, since the modified sensor reading is indistinguishable from the legitimate reading. Such a dishonest act is called direct data injection at- tack [2] , [16] , where even one small modification might influence a total aggregated value. It is, thus, important to minimize the damage by direct data injection attacks. Such a security model is called optimal security [2] , [21] (See Definition 1). We also employ the same security model. Optimal security means that the harmful influence on the final aggregation result is proportional to only the number of corrupted nodes which perform direct data injection attacks.
It is important to achieve constant congestion in large-scale wireless sensor networks. Sensors are usually resource-limited and power-constrained. They suffer from restricted computation, communication, and power resources. The energy savings of performing in-network aggregation are crucial for energy-constrained sensor networks. Since the nodes with the heaviest traffic are typically the nodes which are most essential to the connectivity of the network, their failure may cause the network to partition. Although several protocols [2] , [3] , [21] satisfy optimal security against multiple corrupted nodes, the congestion of these protocols is O(log n) where n is the total number of sensor nodes.
Our Contribution
We propose an efficient and optimally secure sensor network aggregation protocol against multiple corrupted nodes by a random-walk adversary. Our protocol achieves one roundtrip communication between each node and the base station to satisfy optimal security without the result-checking phase, by conducting aggregation along with the verification based on the idea of TESLA technique. Furthermore, we show that the congestion (maximum amount of per-node communication) in our protocol is constant. In other words, the amount of the per-node communication does not increase even if the number of nodes becomes huge. This means that these costs in our protocol are O(1), especially, a leaf node requires just one hash and one MAC computation.
Related Work
There has been many works on preserving integrity in aggregation protocols. The simplest approach is a singleaggregator model [8] - [11] where each node sends its sensor reading directly to the aggregator (e.g., base station), and then the aggregator computes the final aggregation result. However, these protocols suffer from having a single node with high congestion. Also, several protocols do not assume corrupted nodes that are trying to disturb the aggregation result [12] - [15] .
Recently several researchers have examined security issues in aggregation. Although some aggregation protocols [6] , [7] are (optimally) secure against a single corrupted node without corruption of intermediate nodes, these protocols are not optimally secure against multiple corrupted nodes. Some aggregation protocols [2] , [3] , [21] are optimally secure against multiple corrupted nodes even if intermediate nodes are corrupted. These protocols addressed the issue of measuring and bounding corrupted node's contribution to the final aggregation result. In these protocols [2] , [3] , [21] related to our protocol, a network forms an aggregation tree, and then each node sends the aggregate up its parent node in the aggregation tree. The commitment is generated for the aggregate in a manner similar to a Merkle tree [25] . The schemes [17] , [18] enhance the availability of the above schemes [2] , [3] , but do not discussed optimal security which is only discussed in [2] , [21] . Wagner [16] performed a quantitative study measuring the effect of direct data injection attack on various aggregates.
Chan, Perrig and Song [2] defined optimal security for the first time. The CPS protocol uses two kinds of trees: aggregation tree and commitment tree. The commitment tree can be converted to a virtual binary tree for efficiency. As a result, the congestion for commitment verification is minimized.
Manulis and Schwenk [21] designs the data aggregation protocol in wireless sensor networks, called MS protocol, that satisfies optimal security. They provide a rigorous proof of optimal security against node corruption for the first time. The MS protocol aggregates all children data and sends it to parent node. It has two round-trip communications between each node and the base station including the result-checking phase, similar to the CPS protocol [2] .
While the CPS protocol can convert an arbitrary tree to a binary commitment tree, the MS protocol does not consider such a conversion. As a result, the congestion of the MS protocol [21] is less efficient compared with the CPS protocol.
There have been several protocols introduced for preserving the confidentiality of aggregate results [11] , [19] , [20] , [22] - [24] . This issue is different from what our protocol tries to solve and thus is not considered in this paper.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next Sect. 2 we review a survey of other approaches to secure aggregation in sensor networks. Some requirements and preliminary items are provided in Sect. 3. We review the CPS protocol in Sect. 4. We propose our protocol in Sect. 5 and discuss the security and efficiency analysis of our protocol in Sect. 6. We finally conclude this paper in Sect. 7.
Preliminaries
Requirements
The following requirements need to be considered when designing secure in-network aggregation in wireless sensor networks.
• Optimal security [2] , [21] . Optimal security is the concept to minimize the damaging impact of corrupted nodes on the overall aggregation result and assume the integrity of only data except for data modified by direct data injection attacks. The total aggregation result is modified only as long as the direct data injection attack is performed. It is usually difficult to find direct data injection attacks, and hence it is important not to expand the damage of direct data injection attacks. 
Network Assumptions
A sensor network might contain hundreds or thousands of tiny sensor nodes which suffer from restricted computation, communication, and power resources. Most architecture also employs more powerful base station, which is in one-tomany association with sensor nodes. We assume a general multi-hop network with a set S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } of n sensor nodes and a single trusted base station (BS). The sensor network is mostly static with a topology known to BS. This appears to be true of many modern sensor network applications such as a building management. For the purpose of authentication, we consider that every sensor node s i is in possession of a secret key k i shared between s i and BS. Each sensor node s i has a unique identifier I i . We assume that the sensor nodes have the ability to perform computations of a collision-resistant cryptographic hash function H and a secure message authentication code MAC K (·), where K is the cryptographic secret key.
We also assume that aggregation is performed over an aggregation tree, which is the directed tree formed by the union of all the paths from the sensor nodes to BS (See Sect. 4). Each node does not obtain tree information in advance but recognizes only its own parent node and children nodes by wireless communications before aggregation, similar to [2] . This method is described in TaG [4] , in which an ad hoc routing algorithm for WSNs is provided. An aggregation transaction begins by broadcasting a query down the tree from BS to the leaves. Then, the sensor nodes measure their environment, and send their measurements back up the tree to BS. A large building with a control network that regulates inside temperatures by measuring the temperature in each room is one example of a hierarchical structure described in [16] .
Each node can evaluate both the inputs and outputs of aggregation as mentioned in [21] • C). The SUM aggregate is easily used to compute the total number of votes in the network, where all the nodes have value either 1 or 0. Also, the average can be easily computed by dividing the SUM aggregate by the total number of nodes. Furthermore, the proposed protocol can use the verification of Φ-quantile aggregate, as described in [2] .
Adversary Model
The primary concern of this paper is stealthy attacks as defined in [8] . In this type of attack, the adversary controls one or more nodes, and the goal of the adversary is to cause BS to accept a false aggregate by stealth. We refer to nodes that deviate from the protocol (including benign failures) as faulty nodes. An adversary tries to not only inject its own messages (i.e., direct data injection attacks) but also replay or modify the message sent by s i or BS. Furthermore, we consider node corruption. We do not assume any tamperresistance property. Upon corrupting s i , the adversary obtains full control over s i and reveals all information kept in s i including its secret key k i . We do not consider denial-ofservice (DoS) attacks where the goal of the adversary is to prevent BS from getting any aggregation result at all. Such an attack will easily expose the adversary's presence.
We assume a "random-walk adversary model", i.e., an adversary corrupts a node randomly. In practice, an adversary may require much time to corrupt a node. Also, for stealthy operation, he will not stay at one local area in WSNs. In such assumptions, the probability that an adversary obtains the secret keys of adjoining two nodes is negligible, i.e., n c +1 n , where n c and 1 are the number of children nodes and a parent node of a certain node, respectively (This probability is related to the allowable number of times of an attack.). Hence we assume that the adversary obtains the secret key of neither s i 's children nor s i 's parent if he compromises a node s i . This means that the adversary can manipulate the commitment of neither s i 's children nor s i 's parent when s i is compromised. Here, we define the direct data injection attack [2] , [16] as follows. Direct data injection attack: The attack which modifies the data readings reported by the nodes under its direct control, under the constraint that the inputs predicate outputs true, is called "direct data injection attack" [2] . If a secure aggregation scheme has Boolean predicates, it can limit the adversary's capability to perform direct data injection.
Optimal security is the concept to minimize the damaging impact of corrupted nodes on the overall aggregation result and assume the integrity of only data except for data modified by direct data injection attacks. Optimal security means that the harmful influence on the final aggregation result is proportional to only the number of corrupted nodes which perform direct data injection attacks. We can thus define an optimal level of aggregation security as follows:
Definition 1 (Optimal security [2] ): An aggregation algorithm is optimally secure if, by tampering with the aggregation process, an adversary is unable to induce the base station to accept any aggregation result which is not already achievable by direct data injection attacks.
The CPS Protocol
The CPS protocol [2] , which was proposed by Chan, Perrig and Song in 2006, computes the sum aggregate by three phases: query-dissemination, aggregation-commitment and result-checking. The protocol [3] is the modification of the CPS protocol. These protocols assume that the sensor network is mostly static, with a topology known to the base station (BS). The CPS protocol has been already proved to satisfy "optimal security" in [2] . The CPS protocol uses two kinds of trees: aggregation tree and commitment tree. The commitment tree can be converted to a virtual binary tree for efficiency, i.e., all nodes are set to leaf nodes in such a virtual binary tree.
Protocol Description
The following three phases are executed at each session. The session means the duration of one protocol execution). Query-dissemination phase. To initiate a query in the aggregation tree, BS originates a query request message and distributes it to the aggregation tree. The query request message contains an attached nonce N to prevent replay of messages belonging to a prior query. Note that this request message can be sent without an authenticated broadcast, as described in [18] . Aggregation-commitment phase. Every node calculates a message based on its own sensor reading, and sends it to its parent node. This message consists of count, value, commitment , where count is the number of nodes in the subtree rooted at a node, value is the sum of all node values in the subtree, and commitment is the cryptographic commitment tree over the data values and the aggregation process in the subtree. Let c i and v i be the number of nodes in the subtree rooted at s i and a sensor reading of a node s i , respectively, and let H be a collision-resistant cryptographic hash function. For a leaf node s i , the message has the format 1, v i , h i , where 
Drawbacks
The CPS protocol has the following drawbacks:
• The communication overhead on each node is large. The CPS protocol requires two round-trip communications between each node and BS (one roundtrip for query-dissemination phase and aggregationcommitment phase, and another round-trip for the result-checking phase) to do one aggregation procedure. Especially, the result-checking phase has the congestion of O(log n).
• The computational cost at each sensor node is great.
Not only BS but also each sensor node has to compute † We employ h i = H(N||v i ||ID i ) to prevent replay of messages from a leaf node, instead of h i = ID i described in [2] . the final commitment in order to verify the integrity of its own sensor reading in the result-checking phase. Especially, a leaf node has the computational cost of O(log n) in the result-checking phase.
Checking Mechanism
The result-checking phase enables the CPS protocol to satisfy "optimal security". All the honest nodes can check the validity of the own sensor reading in this phase after the final aggregation result is committed. This implies that the adversary cannot modify the sensor readings of honest nodes.
Our Protocol
Feature
Our protocol has the following features: owing to one-time MAC-key to each session, and thus it protects our protocol against replay attacks.
The Format of Message
The message in our protocol consists of count, value, identifier, commitment, confirmation , where count and value are the same as the CPS protocol. We pick a seed k i, randomly and apply H recursively times to the initial seed k i, to generate a one-way hash chain,
, where t denotes the session. The identifier of node s i is computed as
where is the maximum number of sessions and k i, is the secret key of the node s i , shared between s i and BS. Then,
is the secret key of MAC at session t (1 ≤ t ≤ ) and is also treated as a kind of identifier of s i at the next session t + 1, which can be verified by
The commitment is the cryptographic commitment and the confirmation is the confirmation result of MAC in the previous session. For a node s i , its descendant nodes {s i j } and its children nodes {s i 1 , . . . , s i q } ⊆ {s i j }, the message at session t has the following message format:
and 
Protocol Description
Our protocol starts with query-dissemination phase, which is the same as the CPS protocol, then ends with aggregationcommitment phase. It does not need the result-checking phase. In aggregation-commitment phase, two steps of confirmation and aggregation are executed. If s i is a leaf node then it executes neither confirmation process nor aggregation process. s i has only to send the own message M i to its parent. Here, we assume that an intermediate node s i with a secret key k i, has a set of its descendant nodes {s i j }, that is, its children and grandchildren nodes {s i 1 , . . . , s i m } ⊆ {s i j } (m ≥ q). Let t be the number of a current session. We show only the aggregation-commitment phase since the querydissemination is the same as the CPS protocol. 
end if 7: else 8: 
mation using the secret key of each node. BS compares the computed confirmation with the received confirmation. If these results match, then BS accepts the aggregation result of the previous session t − 1. Furthermore, if the final commitments are valid, then BS preserves the aggregation result until the next session. Otherwise, BS rejects the result.
The MAC key k i,t is one link of hash chain in our protocol. Each sensor computes the MAC key from pebbles (i.e., k i,t ← KeyGen(pebble) in Algorithm 2). This can be accomplished using an arbitrary hash chain traversal algorithm. For our protocol we use the algorithm presented in [27] , which requires the computation of 1 2 log 2 links in eahch round and needs to store log 2 links and seeds.
A node receives the messages of its children and grandchildren at most. This means that the congestion of a node s i is proportional to only the total number of {s i 1 , . . . , s i m }. Note that each intermediate node sets a timeout for receiving a message from children. Even after the time expiration by dead battery or crash of a child node, each node still executes the protocol. Actually, BS can confirm such an accident since BS knows all the network topology. When BS notices the accident, an ad hoc routing algorithm [4] reexecutes to reconstruct the aggregation tree by BS's query.
Example (Aggregation-commitment phase):
We show an example of aggregation-commitment phase at session t (≤ ) depicted in Fig. 2. • Confirmation. Let s 3 be a present intermediate sensor node at session t deployed in Fig. 2 = H(k 6,t−1 ) (i.e., k 6,t−1 = k 3 3 ,t−1 ). If the verification of this identifier is valid then s 3 verifies the previous commitment μ k 6 ,t−1 .
If the verification of four commitments is valid then s
Otherwise, s 3 computes the confirmation as MAC k 3,t (NG). After computing the confirmation, s 3 discards count, value, identifier, commitment of s 4 , s 5 , s 6 and s 7 of the previous session t − 1.
• Aggregation. s 3 uses these four messages to check three sensor readings v 4,t , v 5,t and v 6,t . For checking the range of v 6,t , the node s 3 computes the difference between (v 6,t + v 7,t ) in M 6,t and v 7,t in M 7,t . If v min ≤ v 4,t , v 5,t , v 6,t ≤ v max , then s 3 computes its own message:
where k 3,t−1 = H(k 3,t ). Then, s 3 sends its own message M 3,t and forwards its children's messages M 4,t , M 5,t and M 6,t to its parent node s 1 . When s 3 's task is completed, s 3 preserves the information,
and (1, v 7 , k 7,t−1 , μ k 7,t ) until the next session t + 1. Note that s 3 need not forward M 7,t to s 1 since v 7,t is included in M 6,t in Fig. 2. 
Checking Mechanism
While the CPS protocol checks the validity of the own sensor readings in the result-checking phase, our protocol checks the validity of the children sensor readings in the aggregation-commitment phase. In our protocol, although the node s i cannot verify the commitment of children and grandchildren at once, we achieves one round-trip communication by conducting aggregation along with the verification, based on the idea of TESLA.
Analysis
In this section, we discuss security and efficiency of our protocol. In the security analysis, we prove that our protocol is optimally secure. In the efficiency, we show that the congestion (maximum amount of per-node communication) in our protocol is constant. Also, we show that the computational cost of each node in our protocol is smaller than the CPS protocol.
Security
This paper focus on stealthy attacks. Each sensor has a routing information. If an adversary forges the routing information of s i j , the route from s i to its parent node may be changed. However, its new parent node s p notices such a forgery, since s p is assumed to be honest (refer to Sect. 2.3) and does not have s i j 's message of the previous session. Therefore, our protocol is secure against the forgery attack of routing information by a randm-walk adversary, that is, BS can reject such aggregated result which is changed by network topology being forged. As mentioned in Sect. 2.3, an adversary should have only a limited influence on the result of the aggregation computation. We show that the SUM aggregate of our protocol satisfies "optimal security" described in Definition 1, similar to the CPS protocol. We show the following lemmas before showing theorems about "optimal security". Proof. Let the sum of the data values of all the legitimate nodes be S L . Consider an adversary with μ malicious nodes which perform direct data injection attacks. We assume a randmo-walk adversary model and thus he can choose μ malicious nodes under a certain restriction (refer to Sect. 2.3). An adversary causes the nodes under its control to report a sensor reading within the legal range [0, r] . If the adversary sets all μ nodes to have data value 0, the computed aggregate is S L . If the adversary sets all μ nodes to have data value r, the computed aggregate is S L + μr. Any aggregation value between these two extremes is achievable by both attacks. So, the bound of S L ≤ S ≤ (S L + μr) by Theorem 1 is exactly on the range of possible results achievable by both attacks. Therefore, our protocol is optimally secure by Definition 1.
Congestion Complexity
We now consider the congestion induced by the secure SUM aggregate. Congestion is a big problem for large-scale wireless sensor networks, so it is necessary to decrease congestion complexity. Our protocol aims to achieve the constant node congestion not to depend on the total number of nodes (n) owing to one round-trip communication without the result-checking phase. More specifically, we aim to stabilize the maximum amount of information that a single node sends and receives.
While the congestion in the CPS protocol is O(log n) (strictly O(log 2 n) in [2] and O(log n) in [3] ), the congestion of our protocol is constant, i.e., the congestion of a node s a is proportional to only the total number of s a 's children and s a 's grandchildren. This means that our protocol is more scalable and efficient than the CPS protocol. Note that the MS protocol [21] less efficient than the CPS protocol, and, thus, we do not compare our protocol with [21] .
Node congestion in our protocol eventually depends on the number of children nodes. Hence, the smaller the number of children nodes becomes, the lower the node congestion complexity gets in our protocol. Node congestion in our protocol does not depend on the height of aggregation tree, that is, congestion complexity is O(1).
Communication Complexity
One round-trip communication between each node and BS for aggregation is desirable. While the CPS protocol required two round-trip communications, our protocol indeed requires only one round-trip communication. Here, we explain the communication complexity of an intermediate node (A leaf node is also included in Table 1 .). Let n lower be the number of nodes which are deployed in lower part (only descendant nodes) of a current intermediate node (n lower ≤ n), and let |H| and |M| be the size of H and MAC, respectively. In the aggregation-commitment phase (AC), while the size of message in the CPS protocol is almost |H|(n c + 1) which is mainly the size of commitments that a node sends and receives, the size of message in our protocol is almost (|H| + 2|M|)(2n c + n g + 1) which is mainly the size of messages a node sends and receives, described in Table 1 , where n c and n g are the number of children and grandchildren nodes, respectively. However, the size of message additionally requires 2|H| log n lower +|M| in the result-checking phase (RC) of the CPS protocol. Therefore, the communication complexity of our protocol is in total smaller than that of the CPS protocol. We emphasize that the communication complexity of an intermediate node in our scheme does not depend on a position (Of course, they depend on not the total number of nodes but the number of children and grandchildren.). Table 2 The practical analysis of one protocol execution in our scheme (Binary tree). 
Communication complexity
Computational and Storage Costs
The computational and storage costs should not depend on the total number of sensor nodes n because of its restricted computation and storage. Here, we explain the computational cost of an intermediate node (A leaf node is also included in Table 1 .). We compare our protocol with the CPS protocol by the per-node computational cost described in Table 1. Let n upper be the number of nodes which are deployed in upper level of a current intermediate node (n upper ≤ n). Let H and M be the computation of H and MAC, respectively. Both the CPS protocol and our protocol are efficient since they use only hash function and MAC. However, the computational cost of the CPS protocol depends on the number of nodes n upper , i.e., H log n upper + M (a leaf node has the worst case of computational cost of H log n + M), while that of our protocol does not depends on the total number of nodes, i.e., (H + M)(n c + n g + 1) + H 1 2 log 2 + M in the aggregation-commitment phase (AC). Note that H 1 2 log 2 is the computation cost of MAC key derived from pebbles. Thus, our protocol has an advantage over the CPS protocol for the per-node computational cost in wireless sensor networks, especially, the computational cost of a leaf node in our protocol is always smaller than that in the CPS protocol.
The size of extra storage in our protocol is (|H| + |M|)(n c + n g ) + |H| log 2 compared with the CPS protocol, because a node has to preserve the messages of its children and grandchildren of the previous session. However, it is not so significant problem in large-scale wireless sensor networks since the size of storage does not depend on n. Note that a leaf node need not have such storage.
We also emphasize that the computational cost and the storage size of an intermediate node in our scheme does not depend on a position.
Practical Analysis
We conduct the practical performance analysis of our scheme assuming the implementation on MICAz in order to evaluate communication complexity, computational cost and the size of storage from a practical viewpoint. MICAz is a platform fluently used for the research of WSNs, which equips an 8-bit CPU ATmega128L at 7.37 MHz, 128 kB program memory, 4 kB RAM and 512 KB flash memory. Our implemented program by nesC can be saved into this flash memory. We use Avrora simulator [28] for MICAz in this analysis.
We set |M| = |H| = 160 bits and = 2 16 . We assume a binary tree as an aggregation tree, and hence an intermediate node has two children and four grandchildren (i.e., n c = 2 and n g = 4). We employ SHA-1 as a hash function and HMAC-SHA1 as a MAC function, and then it takes 7.97 msec to execute one hash function and 32.1 msec to execute one MAC function on MICAz. We estimate the performance of our scheme using these results described in Table 2 .
As shown in Table 2 , the communication complexity for one protocol execution and the size of storage on each node are about less than 600 bytes; these results are acceptable overhead for current generation of sensor nodes [29] . The computation overhead for one protocol execution ranges from 104 msec to 376 msec. This is much smaller than applying public key cryptographic techniques.
Conclusion
We proposed an efficient and optimally secure sensor network aggregation protocol for general networks and multiple corrupted nodes. Our protocol satisfies "optimal security". The security notion guarantees that the harmful influence on the final aggregation result is proportional to only the number of corrupted nodes subject to direct data injection attacks. As a result, the influence on the total aggregate can be optimally controlled within a certain range. Furthermore, since our protocol achieves one round-trip communication by excluding the result-checking phase, both the node congestion complexity and the computational cost of each node are constant in our protocol. Therefore, these costs in our protocol are O(1), especially, a leaf node requires just one hash and one MAC computation.
